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Brazil’s New Path to Meaningful 
Intellectual Property Protection 
Luiz Miranda* 
Today in Brazil, it takes over eleven years to receive legal 
rights to an invention by means of a patent. This state of af-
fairs provides inadequate intellectual property protection 
for inventors and businesses, hampering Brazil’s desire to 
accelerate innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic 
growth through a national patent system. But a new Joint 
Agreement between the Government of the United States and 
the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil could 
mean rescue is on the way. Both governments agreed to en-
gage in patent work sharing programs between the two pa-
tent offices, in hopes of increased efficiency. Yet, some schol-
ars have warned of dangers and impossibilities such pro-
grams could cause, such as an even greater backlog of pa-
tents waiting to be prosecuted by a flood of new patent fil-
ings. 
This Note addresses the concerns raised by other scholars 
by providing an alternative scenario, using data from simi-
larly executed patent work sharing programs, along with 
data from the Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program 
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already underway, as a basis for its proposition. It explains 
why Brazil continues to pursue a working patent system, and 
also provides extensive background in how patent work 
sharing programs work. Finally, it explains how a properly 
executed program between the United States and Brazil 
could work, and why this Joint Agreement could mark the 
beginning of a new path to meaningful intellectual protec-
tion in Brazil. 
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Imagine you are an inventor in the United States who has devel-
oped a revolutionary new technology in the field of communica-
tions. You seek worldwide intellectual protection of your invention 
via patents and take the appropriate steps to obtain it. You receive a 
patent in Canada one year later and in the United States the follow-
ing year. However, in Brazil, the seventh-largest economy in the 
world, and where your technology is being widely used, a patent has 
yet to be issued eleven years after you filed for it. 
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Brazil has been struggling with its patent system as a means of 
intellectual property protection for some time. From an enforcement 
perspective, the patent system is relatively well accepted and 
properly litigated.1 However, the process of obtaining a patent in 
Brazil is at best ineffective and at worse entirely broken. Neverthe-
less, the country could be on the brink of becoming a meaningful 
player in the global patent protection system, and it may happen with 
help from the United States. This article will analyze how the expe-
dited examination fast lanes that patent work sharing programs pro-
vide may be the solution Brazil has been waiting for. 
The Brazilian Intellectual Property Association (“ABPI”), a 
leading non-profit organization that works in matters related to the 
doctrine and jurisprudence of intellectual property law in Brazil, has 
recognized the value of an operational patent system as a way to 
grow the national economy, increase industry competitiveness, and 
attract investments.2 The Brazilian highest authorities agree.3 
On June 30, 2015, the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil issued a Joint 
Statement on “Patent work sharing between Patent Offices.”4 This 
Joint Statement recognizes that work sharing between the two of-
fices may serve as “a driving force for improving patent quality and 
facilitating the examination process of patent applications.”5 In a 
Joint Communique that same day, United States President Barack 
Obama and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff expressed their sat-
isfaction with the completion of the Joint Statement between the two 
national patent offices “in order to improve efficiencies in the patent 
                                                                                                             
 1 Associação Brasileira de Propriedade Intelectual, Propostas para a 
Inovação e a Propriedade Intelectual. Vol. 1. Fatores de Crescimento Econômico, 
Competitividade Industrial e Atração de Investimentos, ABPI at 16 (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.abpi.org.br/materiais/diversos/volumes1e2propinovacaepi.zip 
[hereinafter ABPI]. 
 2 ABPI, supra note 1 at 16. 
 3 U.S.-Braz., Joint Statement Between the Government of the United States 
and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on Patent Work Sharing 
Between Offices (June 30, 2015), available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/VI.%20U.S.-Brazil%20Joint%20Statement%20on%20Patent%
20Work%20Sharing.pdf [hereinafter Joint Statement]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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registration process.”6 Five months later, on November 24, 2015, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and the Na-
tional Institute of Industrial Property of Brazil (“INPI”) announced 
a Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program (“PPH Pilot Pro-
gram”).7 The PPH Pilot Program commenced on January 11, 2016, 
and it is the first step towards the realization of patent work sharing 
between the two countries.8 
This article analyzes the implications of patent work sharing 
programs between Brazil and the United States, such as the PPH 
Pilot Program. Part I has introduced the problem, and argues that 
such work sharing could provide a potential solution to Brazil’s de-
sire of attracting investment from companies that demand patent 
protection as a pre-requisite, while still reducing its patent prosecu-
tion backlog. Part II describes how a properly operational patent sys-
tem can grow the Brazilian economy, increase industrial competi-
tiveness, and attract investments. In addition, it discusses how the 
current patent prosecution backlog is the system’s main roadblock. 
Part III examines the Joint Statement issued by the United States and 
Brazil on patent work sharing, discusses what Patent Prosecution 
Highway (“PPH”) implementations of such patent work sharing pro-
grams generally look like, and examines the PPH pilot program cre-
ated between the United States and Brazil. Finally, Part IV puts for-
ward the proposition that a properly implemented patent work shar-
ing program could be the answer to Brazil’s patent protection and 
economic goals, while at the same time addressing its backlog prob-
lem. At the same time, the analysis highlights the challenges Brazil 
must face in order to achieve this result. 
                                                                                                             
 6 Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Communique by President Barack 
Obama and President Dilma Rousseff, THE WHITE HOUSE, at 1-2 (June 30, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/joint-communique-pre
sident-barack-obama-and-president-dilma-rousseff [hereinafter White House 
Joint Communique]. 
 7 U.S.-Braz., Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office and the National Institute of Industrial Property of Bra-
zil on A Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program (Nov. 24, 2015), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PPH_MOU_and_Workplan_
USPTO-INPI.pdf. [hereinafter MOU]. 
 8 Id. at 3. 
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II. BRAZIL’S STRIVE TO A FUNCTIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 
A. The Patent System as a Means to Economic Growth 
It is a widespread theory in developed countries such as the 
United States that a patent system drives innovation, research, and 
product development.9 During recent years, President Obama in-
vested in the United States Patent System through initiatives of pa-
tent prosecution speed and quality improvements, aimed to “accel-
erate innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth” in the 
United States.10 However, despite this strong consensus, evidence 
of a patent system as a means to economic growth has yet to be suf-
ficiently established.11 For example, a study of Japan’s expansion of 
its patent rights system in 1988 did not prove to have any measurable 
effect on either innovation or research and development.12 The study 
tried unsuccessfully to measure the relative contribution of different 
patents in relation to technological progress.13 Additionally, patents 
may serve as a means to hinder innovation of others, such as in cases 
of defensive and suppressive strategic patent behaviors, where a 
leading company may patent an invention only as a means of dis-
couraging competitive innovation.14 Nevertheless, there is another 
strong economic argument for the creation of a patent system: to 
discourage trade secret laws and behaviors.15 
                                                                                                             
 9 National Economic Council, Council of Economic Advisers, and Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, A Strategy for American Innovation: Securing 
Our Economic Growth and Prosperity 3 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.w
hitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/InnovationStrategy.pdf (quoting Presi-
dent Obama’s statement that “[t]he key to our success . . . will be to compete by 
developing new products, by generating new industries, by maintaining our role 
as the world’s engine of scientific discovery and technological innovation.” Fur-
ther noting that “we must also commit to making the necessary public investments 
to support high-quality patent examination.”). 
 10 Id. at 22. 
 11 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 325 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) (discussing 
whether more patents mean more and better innovation). 
 12 Id. at 326. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 321. 
 15 Id. at 330. 
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A strong argument made for the existence of a patent system is 
that a working patent system may curb the economic problems cre-
ated by trade secrets and economic monopolies.16 Under this theory, 
if inventors are not awarded patent protection upon disclosure of 
their inventions, they would instead maintain their competitive ad-
vantage through trade secrecy.17 This trade secrecy would affect var-
ious aspects of the economy through undesirable business behav-
iors. The first undesirable outcome of this is that research and de-
velopment would remain focused only on inventions that could suc-
cessfully be kept secret and, therefore, profitable.18 This means in-
ventions that can be easily reverse engineered, or easily reproduci-
ble, would likely see a decrease in investment.19 
Another undesirable outcome of a lack of patent protection 
would be decreased efficiency in manufacturing. “The possessor of 
a secret process for manufacturing a product might not be the most 
efficient manufacturer of that product.”20 The highest output effi-
ciency in this situation is to make available the secret process to the 
most efficient manufacturer.21 Without a patent system, however, 
this is not easily accomplished without a likely loss of rights to the 
invention.22 This also has a compounding effect of keeping secret a 
manufacturing process that may also serve to drive efficient manu-
facturing in other industries and other products.23 The contemplated 
solution of licensing the manufacturing trade secret, among other 
types of trade secrets, is costly due to its high probability of leak and 
high transaction costs.24 Lastly, an economy lacking a patent system 
may be at an increased risk of creating lasting monopolies due to an 
established firm’s product, superior efficiency, or economics of 
scale.25 The patent system may help smaller firms and individual 
                                                                                                             
 16 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 328. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 329. 
 21 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 329. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 330. 
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inventors pierce through established monopolies while securing 
rights to their innovative work.26 
Whether the patent system directly drives economic growth 
through the incentivizing of innovation, or through discouraging of 
economic problems created by trade secrecy and economic monop-
olies, developed countries such as the United States are convinced 
that properly implemented patent protection has a positive impact 
on the future of its economy.27 Yet, even after decades of intellectual 
property growth, studies show that developed countries still struggle 
to establish direct correlations and measurements between a patent 
system and its effects to innovation and the economy in general.28 
The current view is still that “IP studies have far to go before we can 
even hope for consensus about the proper bounds of evidence-based 
intellectual property.”29 This may serve as a further explanation of 
the difference in existing worldwide implementations of patent pro-
tection laws. 
For developing countries such as Brazil, the benefits of a patent 
system mimic the ones of developed countries, but with certain dif-
ferences. The ABPI believes that the published patent itself, with its 
detailed written description, is already an enormous benefit to others 
who want to develop the same technology.30 It further notes that the 
patent system promotes economic and social developments not only 
in technological areas but also in scientific ones.31 The ABPI be-
lieves the patent system is fundamentally an instrument that func-
tions to stimulate and drive industries of research and develop-
ment.32 In addition, for areas such as the pharmaceutical industry, it 
means market availability of medicine to a society that would oth-
erwise not have access to it without patent protection.33 Further-
                                                                                                             
 26 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 330. 
 27 See National Economic Council, supra note 9, at 1, 69. 
 28 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 331. 
 29 John M. Golden, Robert P. Merges & Pamela Samuelson, The Path of IP 
Studies: Growth, Diversification, and Hope, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1757, 1768 (2014) 
(concluding that the article is only a stepping stone into further work to establish 
such an evidentiary-based IP system). 
 30 ABPI, supra note 1, at 16. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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more, the ABPI reports that the availability of legal resources cre-
ated from patent protection decreases the risk that intellectual prop-
erty will be lost, and consequently increases local manufacturing of 
products.34 This drives the creation of local jobs and strengthens the 
local economy.35 In summary, developing countries that provide in-
tellectual property protection are better suited to reap the benefits of 
new worldwide technology, medicine, and cutting edge manufactur-
ing. 
Brazil’s intellectual property laws already exist and are able to 
protect inventors and companies that want to invest in research and 
development in the country.36 The laws appropriately award patent 
owners with temporary rights to exclude others from their inven-
tions, as long as patents are narrowly limited to the scope of their 
written specification.37 However, the inability of applicants to se-
cure a patent in Brazil within a meaningful length of time causes a 
roadblock to reaping the benefits of the available patent protection.38 
At bottom, the question as to whether a patent system is a driver 
of economic growth is up for debate. However, the Brazilian Gov-
ernment believes that a functioning patent system is vital to its do-
mestic investments and economic growth, and this paper will as-
sume the same.39 What is not debatable is that a patent system with 
an eleven-year backlog must be revised. 
B. Brazil’s Patent Backlog Problem 
Brazil has an elephant in the room gaining a lot of attention: the 
backlog. In 2003, the average time to secure a patent in Brazil was 
relatively slow, about six years.40 This increased to about nine years 
in 2009 and is now at an astonishing eleven years.41 In comparison, 
the average time to secure a patent in the United States is just over 
                                                                                                             
 34 Id. 
 35 ABPI, supra note 1, at 16. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (discussing the backlog problem). 
 39 Id. (discussing how a patent system helps to drive its domestic economy). 
 40 Associação Brasileira da Propriedade Intelectual, País demora 11 anos 
para aprovar patentes, BOLETIM DA ABPI NUM. 147 at 4 (May 25, 2015), 
available at http://www.abpi.org.br/materiais/boletim/Bol147.pdf. 
 41 Id. 
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two years, and about three years in both Colombia and Peru.42 The 
United States recognized that a patent system with a large backlog 
may stall innovation and impede economic growth, and it is working 
to reduce what it refers to as its current “enormous” two-year patent 
prosecution backlog.43 In comparison, Brazil has a lot more work to 
do. The Brazilian eleven-year backlog currently renders its patent 
system practically inoperable, especially in areas of technology that 
can become quickly obsolete post invention, such as in communica-
tions and computer technology industries.44 
The result of the backlog problem is that Brazil only has a patent 
system in theory, but not in practice. This diminishes Brazil’s image 
as a country that is able to handle the intellectual property protection 
needs of international investors, and brings uncertainty to both in-
ternational and national patent applicants. This creates a roadblock 
for companies that want to do business in Brazil but are not willing 
to enter the country without meaningful intellectual property protec-
tion. 
The current situation is largely due to the lack of patent examin-
ers in the Brazil’s National Institute of Industrial Property (“INPI”), 
the government agency in charge of examining and issuing pa-
tents.45 In 2014, the INPI employed 192 patent examiners who were 
in charge of handling its backlog of 184,224 patents that year, which 
yields about 980 patents per examiner.46 In comparison, in 2012 the 
United States employed 7,831 patent examiners to handle its 
603,898 patents that year, yielding only about 77 patents per exam-
iner.47 The bottom line is that there are not enough patent examiners 
employed in Brazil to handle the current backlog, and the problem 
is only getting worse. 
Brazil has recognized the issue. It is working to address this 
problem by hiring more patent examiners and undergoing a revamp-
                                                                                                             
 42 Id. 
 43 National Economic Council, supra note 9, at 2 (describing new initiatives 
driven by the Obama administration and the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
improve the United States “enormous” backlog). 
 44 Associação Brasileira da Propriedade Intelectual, supra note 40; ABPI, 
supra note 1, at 16-17. 
 45 ABPI, supra note 1, at 17. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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ing of the country’s public structure, expecting to hire 150 more ex-
aminers per year until 2018.48 The President of the INPI, Luiz Ota-
vio Pimentel, recognized that, in regards to patent protection in the 
country, “[t]he worst thing [Brazil] faces is a backlog.”49 However, 
hiring takes time and money, and Pimentel also recognized that Bra-
zil is currently in a difficult economic situation.50 This grim eco-
nomic situation in Brazil has the effect of “a reduction in expenses 
for public institutions [including the] INPI.”51 
Nevertheless, the country is still interested in assuring its com-
mitment to a viable patent system and to protecting intellectual prop-
erty in the country. Through it, Brazil aspires to stimulate competi-
tiveness and innovation in the country and the internationalization 
of its economy.52 
III. PATENT WORK SHARING 
A. The Patent Work Sharing Joint-Statement 
On June 30, 2015, the United States Department of Commerce 
and Brazil’s Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 
signed a Joint Statement on “Patent Work Sharing Between Patent 
Offices” of both countries.53 The Joint Statement details how the 
two countries reached a common understanding, and proposes a 
common goal.54 The countries considered “the value and the im-
portance of increasing collaborative efforts between the respective 
patent offices, recognizing that work sharing . . . may serve as a 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. at 18. 
 49 James Nurton, Managing Intellectual Property: Patent Office views from 
Brazil, Europe and Japan, EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PLC at 13 
(Oct. 14, 2015) (describing the 2015 International Association for the Protection 
of Intellectual Property Congress lunch panel, featured differing perspectives on 
“continuous improvement of IP systems,” and attended by representatives from 
the Brazil, Europe, and Japan patent offices). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Associação Brasileira da Propriedade Intelectual, supra note 40. 
 53 Joint Statement, supra note 3. 
 54 Id. 
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driving force for improving patent quality and facilitating the exam-
ination of patent applications.”55 The countries acknowledged that 
patent work sharing “may contribute to promotion of innovation and 
investment in [their] economies,” empowering businesses to grow 
and expand their markets across borders.56 The outcome of the Joint 
Statement is an endeavor to “explore patent work sharing arrange-
ments in the short term” via a common understanding: 
The patent offices of the two Governments intend to 
commence cooperative activities, on or after the date 
of signature of [the] Joint Statement, including the 
implementation of a mutually beneficial work shar-
ing pilot program that facilitates the examination of 
patent applications that are commonly filed in the 
United States and Brazil.57 
On that same day, U.S. President Obama and Brazilian President 
Rousseff issued a Joint Communique on their determination to 
“strengthen an increasingly diversified and mature partnership . . . 
and [to] focus on meeting the needs and aspirations of the societies 
of the two largest democracies and economies in the Americas.”58 
The presidents emphasized the important role of bilateral coordina-
tion and dialogue and, on the topic of expanding trade and invest-
ment cooperation, expressed their satisfaction with the completion 
of the Joint Statement between the two national patent offices “in 
order to improve efficiencies in the patent registration process.”59 
The Joint Statement highlights that it “does not create any legal 
obligations under international or domestic law.” 60 While this is 
generally true, the Joint Statement does fall within the international 
law category of soft law–the document is still considered interna-
tional law and should not be viewed as simply aspirational. Soft law 
generally describes non-legally binding international instruments 
                                                                                                             
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 White House Joint Communique, supra note 6. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Joint Statement, supra note 3. 
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that the parties hope will achieve general or universal application.61 
These instruments can represent an interim step in treaty making, 
even if they do not come to fruition.62 In this case, the Joint State-
ment opened the door for the respective countries’ patent prosecu-
tion offices to reach an agreement on how they can implement a pa-
tent work sharing program. 
Soon after, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) and the National Institute of Industrial Property of Bra-
zil (“INPI”) announced a Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program 
(“PPH Pilot Program”).63 Before discussing the details of how the 
PPH Pilot Program was executed, we must understand the context 
in which it is to be implemented. 
B. The Patent Prosecution Highway (“PPH”) 
To understand how patent work sharing agreements work, we 
can look to the most widely used program today, the Patent Prose-
cution Highway.64 The Patent Prosecution Highway (“PPH”) is a 
decision-sharing framework in which two different patent granting 
agencies create an agreement that work generated by a first patent 
office is later shared with a second patent office.65 The USPTO and 
the Japan Patent Office were the first patent granting agencies to 
enter into such an agreement in July 2006, and since then many 
countries have followed suit.66 
PPH agreements initially existed as bilateral agreements be-
tween two patent offices, allowing an applicant whose invention 
claims have been determined to be patentable in an initial country’s 
                                                                                                             
 61 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 49 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2013). 
 62 Id. at 50. 
 63 MOU, supra note 7. 
 64 Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) - Fast Track Examination of Applica-
tions, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-getting-started/international-protection/patent-prosecution-highway-pph-
fast-track (last modified Oct. 17, 2016) [hereinafter USPTO PPH Fast Track]. 
 65 John M. Carson, Alan Kessler & Hugh Dunlop, A Practical Guide to The 
Patent Prosecution Highway, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Apr. 1, 
2009), http://www.managingip.com/Article/2167622/A-practical-guide-to-the-pa
tent-prosecution-highway.html. 
 66 Id. 
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patent filing office, the Office of First Filing, to go through an ac-
celerated examination in a subsequent country’s patent filing office, 
the Office of Second Filing.67 In addition, multilateral PPH agree-
ments, such as the Global and IP5 PPH programs, have seen in-
creased participation by countries around the world, with the Global 
PPH reaching twenty-one member countries as of July 2015.68 Mul-
tilateral agreements allow patent applicants to designate any of the 
member countries’ patent offices as the Office of First Filing or the 
Office of Second Filing, allowing an applicant the flexibility to re-
quest accelerated examination at any, and all, of the member offices, 
once an Office of First Filing has determined the invention claims 
to be patentable.69 The ultimate goal of these agreements is faster 
and more efficient worldwide patent prosecution. According to sta-
tistical data from patent offices that implement PPH agreements, 
those offices have increased efficiency, and accomplished this 
goal.70 
The way PPH programs increase efficiency is by reducing the 
amount of redundancy in the prosecution of patent applications filed 
in multiple patent offices around the world.71 This redundancy exists 
largely due to differences in standards of patentability in different 
countries’ patent laws.72 Patent offices cannot “grant each other’s 
work ‘full faith and credit,’ without harmonizing their statutes.”73 
Therefore, the work done by patent examiners of ensuring that the 
granting of patents adheres to the country’s patent law is largely re-
done, even when the outcome is substantially the same.74 Such work 
includes time-consuming research, such as making sure inventions 
are novel and non-obvious, in light of prior art. 
Properly implemented PPH agreements reduce redundancy in 
the work done by patent examiners.75 First, the patent reaches the 
                                                                                                             
 67 USPTO PPH Fast Track, supra note 64. 
 68 Global Patent Prosecution Highway simplifies existing network, JAPAN 
PATENT OFFICE (July 6, 2015), https://www.jpo.go.jp/ppph-portal/globalpph.htm. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Patent Prosecution Highway Portal Site Statistics, JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/ppph-portal/statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
 71 Carson, supra note 65. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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second country’s patent examiner in a cleaner state, after having 
gone through a full round of examination including any amendments 
to the specification, drawings, or claims, in order to become patent 
eligible in the first country.76 Second, when a patent examiner in the 
second country understands how a patent examiner in the first coun-
try has conducted his or her work to ensure patentability, the exam-
iner in the second country can start his or her work, starting from 
where the first examiner left off.77 This is because the second exam-
iner can rely on the examination already done, and only looks at any 
material that the first examiner did not consider, due to the differ-
ences in the countries’ patentability laws.78 However, dissecting 
these differences is a challenging task, and PPH agreements work 
only if the legal frameworks of patent laws between the countries in 
the agreement share significant commonality. Only then can the sec-
ond office dramatically reduce the need for further examination. 
Due to the rise of the global economy, and the growth of intel-
lectual property as a global trade, the desire to align domestic patent 
laws of different countries has grown significantly in the past two 
centuries. 79 The Trade Related International Property Agreement 
(“TRIPS”), passed in 1994, marked a turning point in recent phases 
of development concerning proposals to harmonize domestic patent 
laws at the international level.80 The agreement laid down substan-
tive principles that applied to all members of the World Trade Or-
ganization (“WTO”) and signaled “the inevitability of a more har-
monized and strong global patent system.”81 Successful PPH imple-
mentations are best evidenced in countries that share substantive pa-
tent law, creating huge benefits.82 Japan and Korea provide good 
                                                                                                             
 76 Carson, supra note 65. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 David Kappos, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Address at the 
Managing IP International Patent Forum: A Global Call for Harmonization, 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.u
spto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kapposlondon.jsp. 
 80 Dongwook Chun, Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Globalization: 
The Necessity and Strategy for a Pragmatic Outcome, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMA
RK OFF. SOC’Y 127, 129 (2011). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 153; Etienne De Villiers, The Patent Prosecution Highway: Canada 
as Office of First Filing, 2 LANDSLIDE 30, 31 (2010). 
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examples—the substantive patent law is almost identical in those 
countries. In the United States and Canada, patent laws grew from 
similar principles.83 Therefore, Brazil can only successfully reap the 
benefits of a Patent Prosecution Highway agreement with the United 
States if its patent laws are at least substantially comparable to the 
U.S. patent laws. 
C. The Established USPTO-INPI PPH Pilot Program 
On November 23, 2015, the USPTO and the INPI signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding creating a PPH pilot program “as 
contemplated in the June 30, 2015 Joint Statement between the 
United States Government and the Government of Brazil.”84 Alt-
hough limited, the pilot program is the first realization of the aspi-
rations set forth by the Government of Brazil to change its patent 
system in attempts to promote innovation and cross-country invest-
ment in its economy. 
The PPH Pilot Program, which launched on January 11, 2016, 
functions as a limited pilot for commencing cooperation between the 
patent offices of both countries.85 At the same time, the program is 
aimed to encourage cooperation of patent work sharing between the 
two offices, while still allowing for complete liberty of office-spe-
cific guidelines.86 This includes the liberty of both offices “to reflect 
their respective legal terminology and processes,” and to allow ad-
ditional flexibility beyond the core requirements.87 This results in 
the ability of each office to fully determine how much work, or how 
little work, to leverage from the Office of First Filing, without any 
minimum requirements.88 As usual of a PPH program, the ultimate 
decision of patentability remains at the sole discretion of the Office 
of Second Filing, in accordance to its national laws.89 
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The extent of the program will be limited, allowing only up to 
150 patents to enter the program during its two-year maximum pe-
riod.90 In 2014, this would mark only a small percentage (roughly 
5%) of the 2,749 patents granted in Brazil that year, and an even 
smaller percentage (roughly 0.5%) of the 30,342 patents that were 
filed that year.91 Although the USPTO is free to accept any applica-
tion where the INPI was the Office of First Filing, the INPI will 
conversely accept PPH applications only where the USPTO was the 
Office of First Filing to recent or newly filed utility applications in 
the field of oil, gas, or petrochemical inventions.92 On August 25, 
2016, seven months into implementation, the INPI had accepted 
twenty-two patent applications under the PPH pilot program, with 
an average time to reach a decision of patentability from initial re-
quest at just 117 days, a promising number.93 Yet, this small number 
of applicants at seven months after the program’s introduction, high-
lights its limited accessibility. 
The PPH Pilot Program, however limited, still has the potential 
to become a historical turning point in Brazil’s strive to become a 
meaningful player of global intellectual property protection. The Pi-
lot Program highlights its intended plan to be evaluated upon its con-
clusion for “efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness.”94 This entails 
analyzing the results obtained by all applications processed by the 
program for measurements that can gauge its success.95 Such meas-
urements would include comparing the time to grant a patent within 
the program with the time to grant a similar patent outside the pro-
gram. 
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The program’s success will likely depend on whether the pilot 
program, like any other such subsequent patent work sharing pro-
gram, is positioned to take significant advantages of similarities be-
tween the two countries’ domestic patent laws. 
IV. PATENT WORK SHARING AS A SOLUTION TO BRAZIL’S PATENT 
INDUSTRY GROWTH ASPIRATIONS 
Patent work sharing programs, such as the new USPTO-INPI 
PPH Pilot Program, may provide a new avenue for applicants seek-
ing patent protection in Brazil. This new avenue may serve as the 
solution to the Brazilian Government’s desire to grow its national 
economy, increase industry competitiveness, and attract invest-
ments through an operational patent system.96 There are fears that 
such programs may hurt Brazil’s current patent backlog, due to these 
programs opening the doors to an expedited track for a significant 
amount of foreign patent filers.97 However, if properly imple-
mented, it is possible for Brazil not only to open those doors and 
increase the number of annual patent grants, but also to help de-
crease its backlog. 
A. Patent Work Sharing as a Fast-Lane to Patent Examinations 
The main benefit of patent work sharing programs is their po-
tential of increasing efficiency in the patent examination process.98 
This increased efficiency comes from the potential decrease in time 
it takes for a patent examiner in the Office of Second Filing to reach 
a final decision as to granting or denying a patent, when such patent 
has already been granted in another country’s Office of First Fil-
ing.99 The improvements in patent examination speed are directly 
proportionate to two factors: 1) the differences in the domestic pa-
tent law between the countries participating in the patent work shar-
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ing program, and 2) how much credibility the second country’s fil-
ing office is willing to give to the already produced work of the first 
country’s filing office.100 
Extreme examples of both factors illustrate the possibilities for 
speed improvement of patent work sharing. First, when the domestic 
patent laws between participating countries are distinct, any exami-
nation work completed in a country’s Office of First Filing would 
have no bearing on the examination work that still must be done at 
any subsequent country’s filing office. Second, even when the first 
factor is met, if a country’s Office of Second Filing does not give 
any faith and credit to the previous examination work performed in 
the first country’s filing office, there is no opportunity of efficiency 
improvement in the Office of Second Filing’s patent examination. 
In either of these scenarios, the time it takes to get a patent filed in 
the Office of Second Filing is exactly the same regardless of whether 
or not the patent is part of the patent work sharing program. 
At the same time, if a country shares the same patent laws as 
another, the Office of Second Filing may potentially reduce the time 
it takes to examine a patent to virtually nothing. This will depend on 
how much faith and credit the Office of Second Filing gives to the 
work performed by the Office of First Filing during its patent exam-
ination. This is possible because there would be no new work to be 
done by the Office of Second Filing; all of the examination effort is 
applicable and has already been completed by the Office of First 
Filing.  Therefore, when a country shares the patent laws of the first 
examining country and gives complete trust to the work already 
completed by that country’s examiners, a patent work sharing agree-
ment creates an opportunity for full efficiency of the second coun-
try’s examination process. 
There is an important implication of this described scenario of 
absolute patent work sharing efficiency. Under this scenario, apart 
from insignificant transaction costs, the time to get a patent for a 
new invention in the second country will never be greater than the 
same time it takes to get a patent in the first country. This remains 
true regardless of the second country’s examination time and re-
mains possible irrespectively of any existing backlog. This is possi-
ble because an applicant who wants patent protection is able to file 
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for a patent simultaneously in both countries, and once the patent is 
granted in the country where examination is the fastest, the applicant 
could then immediately apply to enter expedited prosecution—for 
example, through a patent prosecution highway application—in the 
country with slower patent examination. In the scenario where the 
slower country—that would become the country with the Office of 
Second Filing—has equal domestic patent laws and gives full faith 
and credit to the examination of the faster country—which becomes 
the country with the Office of First Filing—the patent would be im-
mediately approved, as there is no more work to do. 
The two factors highlighted above currently drive the success of 
patent work sharing programs around the globe. The most prominent 
example of how a patent work sharing agreement can have a signif-
icant effect is the PPH program between Japan and Korea. 101 Be-
cause the patent laws in Japan and Korea are substantially the same, 
an applicant with a previously issued patent in Japan has been able 
to obtain a patent in Korea in only 28 days.102 Still, such a successful 
result can be obtained only when both factors described can be met 
to a significant extent. Due in part to the disagreement between 
countries and scholars on how patent laws drive economic growth, 
and which issues of patentability are better aligned with a country’s 
goal, worldwide patent laws can be significantly misaligned.103 
The PPH agreement between the United States and Canada pro-
vides an example of a more typical and successful patent work shar-
ing program. In 2010, Canada’s Patent Office was marketed as an 
Office of First Filing for applicants who were interested in the quick-
est road to a patent in the United States. 104 This push noted the sim-
ilarities between the two countries in not only their language, but 
also in their domestic patent laws.105 
Canada incentivized its patent office as an Office of First Filing 
because it allows applicants to pay for expedited examination 
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through a special provision of the Canadian Patent Rules.106 
Through this route, a patent would be examined in Canada in as little 
as four weeks, and it was common for an applicant to receive a grant 
in as little as eighteen months from initial filing.107 The applicant 
could then use this allowance as the basis to expedite a patent appli-
cation of the same invention in the United States, resulting in a 
United States-issued patent in less than two years: a 30-50% time 
savings from the 35.3-month average at the time.108 
David Kappos, the Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Prop-
erty and the Director of the USPTO, dubbed this strategic patent 
route “Toronto Pronto.”109 Patent applications filed through the To-
ronto Pronto strategy were known to receive United States grants in 
less than a year in some cases, a significant reduction in examination 
time in comparison to traditional filings at the USPTO at the time.110 
Concurrently, the Canadian PPH fast lane was also available as an 
expedited path for patents filed first in the United States, with the 
Canadian office as the Office of Second Filing. 111 The average pen-
dency from PPH requests in Canada to a final decision averaged 
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only 5.4 months in 2014.112 This examination time was also consid-
erably shorter than the 32.9-month average pendency of non-PPH 
Canadian patent applications filed in that same period.113 
The success of the PPH path between Canada and the United 
States, and vice-versa, is only possible because Canada and the 
United States share a similar legal framework.114 Claims drafted for 
the United States are generally also allowable in Canada provided 
that they meet the similar U.S. patent law requirements of subject 
matter, novelty, and obviousness.115 The main caveat to using To-
ronto Pronto is making sure that the claims sought are allowable 
subject matter in Canada.116 General categories of non-patentable 
subject matter include “mathematical formulae or ‘mere’ discover-
ies, methods of medical treatment, higher life forms, business 
schemes, methods of playing an existing game, and professional 
skill/judgment.”117 However, the United States has some of the 
broadest scope of patentable subject matters compared with other 
jurisdictions, meaning that some of its patentable inventions may 
not be patentable elsewhere.118 
B. Comparison of the Patent Laws of the U.S. and Brazil 
The United States and Brazil domestic patent laws share many 
substantive views on what constitutes a patentable invention.119 Bra-
zil has implemented patent laws that comply with the Trade Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement, as 
adopted by the World Trade Organization.120 Brazil has adhered to 
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TRIPS requirements in its patent laws and has introduced patent pro-
tections for both pharmaceutical products and processes.121 The Bra-
zilian patent law also includes similar bars to patentability such as 
lack of novelty and inventive step.122 The most common grounds for 
invalidity include lack of enablement and lack of support in the spec-
ifications.123 Under Brazil’s patent law, Article 24 describes lack of 
enablement and best mode requirement as: 
. . . [T]he specification must describe the subject 
matter clearly and sufficiently so as to enable a per-
son skilled in the art to carry it out and to indicate, 
when applicable, the best mode of execution.124 
Article 25 describes lack of support in the specifications as: 
. . . [T]he claims must be based on the specification, 
characterizing the particulars of the application and 
defining clearly and precisely the subject matter to 
be protected.125 
The United States also enforces that patents satisfy the enable-
ment, best mode, and support in the specification requirements in its 
laws.126 Under U.S. law, lack of enablement and best mode are en-
forced by the requirement that: 
The specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
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forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or 
joint inventor of carrying out the invention.127 
In addition, similar specification support enforces that: 
The specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claim-
ing the subject matter which the inventor or a joint 
inventor regards as the invention.128 
These texts demonstrate some strikingly similarities between the 
domestic patent laws of both countries. However, Brazilian’s patent 
law is not as broad as the United States’ patent laws when it comes 
to patentable subject matter. In the United States, a claim that falls 
within one of the four enumerated categories of patentable subject 
matter recited in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (i.e., process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter) is still not patentable if the claims 
are directed to nothing more than abstract ideas (such as mathemat-
ical algorithms), natural phenomena, and laws of nature.129 In addi-
tion, judicially recognized exceptions have been described using 
various other terms, including “physical phenomena,” “scientific 
principles,” “systems that depend on human intelligence alone,” 
“disembodied concepts,” “mental processes” and “disembodied 
mathematical algorithms and formulas.”130 
In comparison, Brazil includes a much wider array of unpatent-
able subject matters.131 According to Article 10 of Brazil’s Patent 
Law, all of the following are not patentable: 
I. discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical 
methods; II. purely abstract concepts; III. schemes, 
plans, principles or methods for commerce, account-
ing, financing, education, advertising, lottery and 
control; IV. literary, architectural, artistic and scien-
tific works, or any aesthetic creation; V. computer 
programmes per se; VI. presentations of information; 
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VII. rules of a game; VIII. operating or surgical tech-
niques and methods, as well as therapeutic or diag-
nostic methods for the treatment of humans or ani-
mals; and IX. the whole or part of natural living be-
ings and biological material found in nature or also 
isolated therefrom, including the genome or 
germplasm of any natural living being and he natural 
biological processes.132 
In addition, Article 18 also provides that the following are not 
patentable: 
I. that which is contrary to [accepted principles of] 
morality and good conduct and to public safety, order 
and health; II. substances, matter, mixtures, elements 
or products of any kind, as well as any modification 
of their physical-chemical properties and the respec-
tive processes of obtaining or modifying them, when 
they result from the transformation of the atomic nu-
cleus; and III. The hole or part of living beings, ex-
cept transgenic microorganisms which meet the three 
requirements for patentability - novelty, inventive 
step and industrial application - specified in Article 8 
and which are not mere discoveries.133 
The result is a mixed bag, the striking differences between pa-
tentable subject matters in Brazil versus the United States likely 
mean that the potential for a patent work sharing program varies 
largely by industry. For example, the pharmaceutical industry may 
not be able to take advantage of a patent work sharing program as 
successfully as the communication technology industry, due to Bra-
zil’s requirement that a patent must withstand acceptable principles 
of “morality and good conduct and to public safety, order and 
health.”134 Brazil’s public health oriented, TRIPS-compliant ap-
proach to patent laws in relation to pharmaceuticals, has created a 
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balance within its intellectual property regime between pharmaceu-
tical innovation and access to medicines.135 Although a positive ap-
proach for Brazil to provide affordability to healthcare in the coun-
try, this creates a unique set of domestic laws in comparison with 
the United States, and could therefore be an industry where a patent 
work sharing program would be unable to excel. 
In addition to statutory text comparison, Brazil will have to 
study and keep up to date with the ever-changing jurisdiction inter-
pretation of United States patent laws. For example, The Supreme 
Court has changed the interpretation of the definiteness statutory re-
quirement to patentability in 2014, in the case of Nautilus, Inc. v. 
Boisig Instruments, Inc.136 The United States Federal Code statutory 
language requires that a patent specification “conclude with one or 
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the 
invention.”137 Prior to the case, United States Federal Courts en-
forced that a patent claim could only be considered legally indefi-
nite, and therefore unpatentable, when it was “insolubly ambigu-
ous”—just short of ambiguous.138 The Supreme Court concluded 
that this standard did not satisfy the statutory requirements, and in 
place of the “insolubly ambiguous” standard, held that a patent is 
invalid for indefiniteness “if its claims, read in light of the specifi-
cation delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to in-
form, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the 
scope of the invention.”139 These two interpretations of patentability 
flow from an unchanged statutory text, and highlight the difficult 
task Brazil must face to establish an efficient patent work sharing 
program. 
Nevertheless, once a patent avoids the hurdle of being a patent-
able subject matter in Brazil, and other potential differentiating fac-
tors, there is great potential for the substantial examination in Brazil 
to share significant similarities with the examination of the same pa-
tent in the United States. In addition, patent laws are not static, and 
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there is current aspiration and tendency for global patent laws to 
converge even further in the future.140 
C. Implementation as the Key to Success 
Once a patentable invention is identified as patentable subject 
matter in both countries, the focus will turn to how much credibility 
the country’s Office of Second Filing is willing to give to the first 
country’s Office of First Filing prior work. 
In a future patent work sharing agreement between the United 
States and Brazil, the most common scenario would be for a patent 
to be granted first in the United States and then subsequently re-
quested to move to the fast lane in Brazil. This means the USPTO 
would become the Office of First Filing and the INPI the Office of 
Second Filing. Therefore, it will be up to INPI as Brazil’s patent 
office to decide how much credit to give to the work already per-
formed at the USPTO, having a direct impact on the ultimate success 
of the patent work sharing program. 
In typical patent work sharing agreements, the local patent office 
makes the ultimate determination of what is patentable.141 This 
means that how Brazil chooses to implement its phase of the PPH 
Pilot Program, or any other patent work sharing program in the fu-
ture, will have a great impact on the time efficiencies during Brazil’s 
patent examination stage as the Office of Second Filing. Brazil must 
conduct a careful comparative analysis of patentability laws be-
tween itself and the United States, identifying all intricate scenarios 
where a patent would be granted in the United States but not in Bra-
zil. The USPTO office has vowed to help Brazil in this effort, but 
Brazil will still need to make a significant investment if it wants such 
programs to succeed.142 
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Once the key differences and similarities of domestic patent 
laws are identified, Brazil can implement a domestic examination as 
the Office of Second Filing that focuses only on the extra steps nec-
essary to also grant the same patent in Brazil. In addition, Brazil will 
need to give full faith and credit to the work already done by its peers 
at the USPTO and take their prior examination at face value. 
For example, one of the first steps to patent examination after 
identifying the invention is conducting what is known as a “Search 
of Prior Art.”143 This involves conducting a thorough search of all 
domestic and foreign patents, publications, and other relevant prior 
art.144 Conducting a search of prior art can be a time consuming pro-
cess.145 This work would already have been completed by the 
USPTO as the Office of First Filing and reducing its redundancy 
would be key to lowering Brazil’s examination time.146 
The next steps the USPTO does after identifying the prior art is 
to apply its domestic patent laws to determine patentability in rela-
tion to the prior art.147 This includes several steps: a determination 
of patentable subject matter; an analysis of adequacy in specification 
and claims, including enablement and best mode requirements; and 
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the finding of whether the requirements of novelty and non-obvi-
ousness have been met.148 As previously discussed, there is also op-
portunity for efficiency in this phase, through the proper identifica-
tion of what relevant work would already have been done at the 
USPTO, and a focus only to the exceptions. 
Therefore, the amount of time savings of a patent work sharing 
program between the United States and Brazil will be impacted by 
not only how much trust the INPI gives to the work done at the 
USPTO, but also how much investment the INPI makes to stream-
line the productivity of Office of Second Filing’s patent examina-
tions. 
Consequently, the priority it gives to examinations as an Office 
of Second Filing in comparison to its standard examinations will 
also have a tremendous impact due to the current backlog. The INPI 
would need to prioritize examination of patents that are part of the 
patent work sharing program or they will face the same fate of ex-
isting patents in the system. However, this ultimately raises the 
question as to how a patent work sharing agreement may affect the 
existing patent backlog problem. 
D. Outsourcing The Backlog Problem 
Brazil is faced with the challenging question of how many re-
sources to dedicate to the success of a patent work sharing program, 
when it is already facing a significant backlog of work. There is con-
cern that a patent work sharing program will never be successful 
until the INPI first addresses the backlog, because “there would not 
be enough patent examiners to cope with the avalanche of expedited 
examination cases.”149 The concern is rooted in the current work-
force of examiners at the INPI, concluding that prior to the success-
ful implementation of a patent work sharing program, the INPI 
would need to increase substantially the number of examiners.150 
This concern is sincere, but misguided. A patent work sharing 
program will not open the doors to expedited examinations to the 
detriment to Brazil’s already unmanageable backlog problem. Alt-
hough accurate that a successful expedited path to a Brazilian patent 
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has the potential to significantly increase the number of patents cur-
rently filed at the INPI, it would also cause a significant decrease in 
patents filed at the INPI via the traditional route of initially filing 
and prosecuting in Brazil. 
A decrease in traditional patent filings is possible due to the po-
tential of an enormous time saving in obtaining a patent via an ex-
pedited route, such as a PPH route. The number of patents filed in 
Brazil by non-resident applicants continues to grow.151 In 2014, out 
of the 32,395 patent applications, only 14% of them were made by 
Brazilian residents.152 Foreign patent filers will already be inclined 
to take advantage of an expedited route to a Brazilian patent, as they 
may already be familiar with patent filings in multiple offices. 
Therefore, if the INPI is successful in its investment to properly im-
plement a program that yields significant time saving in the expe-
dited route, this would cause a large shift in patent filings to that 
route, thus decreasing the number of patents filed done in the tradi-
tional, slower route. 
Patents currently sitting in the backlog may also benefit from a 
successfully implemented expedited route. If one looks at the cumu-
lative period of 2003-2014, which make up the majority of patents 
in the current eleven-year backlog, the current percentage of resident 
patents is only about 22%.153 This means that most patents sitting in 
the backlog right now are from foreign patent applicants, many 
which may have the same patent already granted in the United States 
and could immediately qualify for a more broadly implemented pa-
tent work sharing program. 
Although the overall number of patents filed in Brazil may in-
crease, if Brazil reaches the level of patent work sharing success that 
gave rise to the Toronto Pronto, it would yield as much as 70% sav-
ings in time. Brazil would grant patents through such an expedited 
program in only 40.7 months—about three years—instead of the 
current eleven years for a traditional filing.154 This result is calcu-
lated by adding the current 35.3-month average time it takes to get 
                                                                                                             
 151 Statistical Country Profile: Brazil: Patent Applications, WORLD INTELL-
ECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/co
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 153 Id. (adding together the statistical data from the year 2003-2014). 
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a patent in the United States, to the average 5.4-month pendency 
realized in Canada from PPH requests to a final decision.155 Yet, this 
might be an aggressive goal for Brazil to achieve. 
The 35.3-month timeframe is the average amount of time it cur-
rently takes to get a patent in the United States today, and is not 
something that Brazil has any control over.  Additionally, the 5.4-
month pendency realized in the Toronto Pronto scenario would be 
difficult for Brazil to duplicate. Canada enjoyed particular ad-
vantages as an Office of Second Filing when it entered a patent work 
sharing program with the United States: a similar legal framework; 
a shared language, giving way to English claims and examination; 
and an existing familiarity with the U.S. law and USPTO proce-
dures.156 Nevertheless, the potential in economic and temporal sav-
ings are so significant that even if Brazil’s Office of Second Filing 
examination time is one year—more than double the time achieved 
by Canada—such a program would still yield a 64% savings in time 
over traditional filing, with a patent granted in a total of four years 
as opposed to eleven. 
In such a scenario, it’s also important to note that the majority 
of the examination is actually being done by the USPTO in the 
United States and not the INPI in Brazil. This includes the time con-
suming prior art search and initial patentability determination. Con-
sidering the high number of patent filings in Brazil from foreign en-
tities, this means that nearly 85% of new patent filings, in addition 
to nearly 78% of patents currently sitting in the backlog, would in-
stead be substantially examined by the USPTO and not the INPI. 
The result of this is the potential for Brazil to fundamentally out-
source the bulk of its patent examination, including a significant part 
of its backlog, to the United States. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Brazil may be on the verge of making significant strides on its 
plan for domestic economic growth through a functioning patent 
system. The final results of the PPH Pilot Program currently in place 
remain to be seen, as well as the results of any future patent work 
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sharing agreements entered by the Brazilian Government. The coun-
try may be able to successfully implement these programs given its 
existing challenges, but it will take an appropriate amount of invest-
ment and commitment. Nevertheless, it remains clear that Brazil is 
serious about keeping up with a growing trend towards meeting re-
search and developers’ demands of worldwide intellectual property 
protection, and it is exploring new paths to achieve that goal. 
 
